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 In its March 26, 2016 issue, The Economist magazine announced that “America needs a giant 
dose of competition.”1  Its study of industry concentration and profits suggested that, after decades 
of consolidation, competition had decreased across a broad range of the American economy.2  An 
April 2016 issue brief by the Council of Economic Advisors reached similar conclusions, stating that 
“competition appears to be declining” due to “increasing industry concentration, increasing rents 
accruing to a few firms, and lower levels of firm entry and labor market mobility.”3  
  
 The promotion of competition in the American economy is a task that has traditionally 
fallen to the enforcement agencies at the federal and state level, relying on the main antitrust 
statutes.4  However, the challenge of declining competition has also prompted interest in the use of 
regulatory alternatives to antitrust to “catalyze” competition.5  The strategy involves using industry-
specific statutes, rulemakings, or other tools of the regulatory state to achieve the traditional 
competition goals associated with the antitrust laws.6  Hence, “antitrust via rulemaking.” 
 
While conducting competition policy outside of the main antitrust laws is not entirely new, it 
came into some prominence through an April 15, 2016 Executive Order issued by the White 
House.7  In that order, the President charged the executive agencies as follows:   
 
Executive departments and agencies with authorities that could be used to enhance 
competition (agencies) shall, where consistent with other laws, use those authorities 
to promote competition, arm consumers and workers with the information they 
need to make informed choices, and eliminate regulations that restrict competition 
without corresponding benefits to the American public.8 
																																																								
† Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor at Columbia Law School. The author was previously an advisor to the 
National Economic Council in the Executive Office of the President, and some of the ideas are drawn from that period. 
The opinions expressed within are not to be attributed to anyone other than the author. I thank Tom Merrill for 
comments. 
1  Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-giant-dose-competition-too-
much-good-thing.  
2 Id. (“One way American firms have improved their moats in recent times is through creeping consolidation . . 
. . The weighted average share of the top four firms in each sector has risen from 26% to 32%.”). 
3 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER 4 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf. 
4 Id. at 8.  
5 See id. at 11–12. 
6 Id. 
7 Exec. Order No. 13,725, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,417 (Apr. 15, 2016). 
8 Id. 
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 In the field of administrative law, there is a longstanding debate over the relative merits of 
rulemaking and adjudication.9  Beginning in the 1960s there was a decisive shift among most 
agencies toward rulemaking.10  However, with exceptions (most of which are described here), the 
promotion of competition – the antitrust regime – remains rooted in an adjudication model, and 
might even be described as stuck there.   More effective and widespread promotion of competition 
may require more widespread and effective use of pro-competitive rulemaking by a broader variety 
of agencies. 
 
This paper has two goals.  The first goal is to better describe the regulatory tools used by 
agencies and government—the so-called “competitive catalysts.” This paper attempts to develop 
both a vocabulary and basic theoretical account that helps to understand how rulemaking can 
promote competition.  It does so by providing a taxonomy of major tools used to catalyze 
competition.  Among the tools are: 
 
- Separation or Quarantine Rules:  Aimed at breaking longstanding ties or bundles; 
 
-  Pro-competitive Deregulation:  The elimination or softening of regulatory barriers to entry or 
costs of competition; 
  
- Switching Cost Reducers:  Rules designed to reduce the costs of switching between 
competitors; 
 
- Levelers:  Rules designed to help equalize the conditions of competition in some way, 
such as common-carriage rules; and  
 
- Price Transparency regimes:  Rules meant to prevent firms from hiding elevated prices. 
 
This descriptive work is important because this is an area where the vocabulary now used is 
particularly confusing.11 For instance, the word “deregulation” has been used both to describe the 
																																																								
9  See, e.g., William T. Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking Versus Adjudication Problem in Agency 
Lawmaking, 1980 DUKE L.J. 103, 103–04; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529, 529–30 (2005). 
10 See Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 
53 Admin. L. Rev. 1139, 1147 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: 
The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 546-49 (2002).   
11  Much of the confusion arises from the association between government action and the restriction of 
competition. It is true that laws and regulations do sometimes deliberately impede competition—as in the awarding of 
patent rights or of exclusive franchises. But they can also promote competition—consider the Sherman Act and Clayton 
Acts, or some of the schemes considered below, like the Hatch-Waxman Act’s promotion of the market entry of generic 
drugs.  See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012) (effective July 2, 1890); see also Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–
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removal of regulations, and also the enactment of new regulations intended to promote 
competition.12  Phrases like “light-touch” regulation are equally vague, and are often better described 
as pro-competitive regulation. 
 
A second goal of the paper is the admittedly difficult goal of trying to understand why some 
competition initiatives have worked, while others fail.  As these are highly complex industries and 
regulatory initiatives, any such analysis cannot be definitive.  Nonetheless, a study of the efforts to 
jump-start competition yields patterns from which best-practices might be derived, and from which 
any future regulator should learn.13  The paper concludes with a list of best-practices or rules-of-
thumb for those who would hope to use laws to catalyze competition in the future. 
 
The paper proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides background and context.  Part II 
discusses some of the economic theory behind pro-competitive regulation and provides a taxonomy 
and description of the major categories of pro-competitive regulation.  Part III discusses both the 
potential, but also the limitations and possible perils of regulatory competition policy. 
 
I. Background  
 
This section describes the traditional divide between the “regular” and regulated industries, 
and the later 20th Century movement to introduce competition into the regulated industries.  It then 
describes several major statutory schemes that can be considered ancestors of today’s pro-
competitive regulatory efforts.  Finally, it discusses more recent pro-competitive efforts, particularly 




The contemporary interest in competition catalysts can be understood as an evolution of the 
nation’s approach towards regulated industries and as such, an evolution of the deregulation 
movement that began in the late 1970s and 1980s.  In context, what this paper describes is a 
broadening of some of the regulatory techniques discussed by Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill 
in 1998 to reach a larger set of industries, and using a wider set of tools. 14 
 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act]. And some laws do neither, like public safety or consumer 
protection rules. The latter may impose costs on businesses, but that’s very different than saying that such costs affect 
competition. 
12 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1323, 1325 (1998).  
13 Another effort in this vein is SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN REGULATING AND DEREGULATING UTILITIES: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE UK, EUROPE, AND THE USA (Colin Robinson ed., 2004). 
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For most of the 20th century, the antitrust paradigm and the public utility paradigm were the 
mainstays of economic regulation in the United States.15  (A third approach, nationalization, was 
never particularly popular in the United States, despite a few experiments, like the brief 
nationalization of AT&T).16  The antitrust paradigm presupposed markets that were capable of 
competition, but were also vulnerable to cartelization or monopolization.17  Antitrust enforcement 
pursued by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission was prosecutorial, case 
driven, and inescapably motivated by some concept of wrongful conduct causing harm.  It existed in 
contrast to the public utility paradigm, which in its original form, presupposed an industry that could 
not reasonably be left entirely to its own devices, for one reason or another.18  The origins of public 
utilities lay in the common law concept that some businesses were “public callings,” or, in the phrase 
used by Lord Hale, “affected with a publick interest.”19  As the Supreme Court put it: 
 
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make 
it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one 
devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants 
to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public 
for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.20 
 
There was more than one public consideration for which an industry might find itself in 
category of a public calling, utility or regulated industry.  Examples included the potential for price 
gouging and a desire for consistent service (energy, electricity, and the telephone system), public 
safety (medicines, nuclear power), public-service goals (broadcasting), or systemic economic risk 
(banking and insurance).  By the New Deal most of these industries would be governed by a federal 
commission, and sometimes state commissions as well, forming, as a whole, what came to be called 
the “regulated industries.”21  The new agencies and their rules typically sought to control entry and 
exit, regulate prices, or to directly regulate how the industry conducted its business to ensure public 
safety, financial stability or other public goals.22    
																																																								
15 See id. at 1329–30. 
16 See RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 400–05 (2010). 
17 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS 1–5 (6th ed. 2014) (“Antitrust law is the study of competition. It is a body of law that seeks to assure 
competitive markets through the interaction of sellers and buyers in the dynamic process of exchange. . . . [T]he 
promotion of competition through restraints on monopoly and cartel behavior clearly emerges as the first principle of 
antitrust.”). 
18 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 12, at 1325. 
19 LORD HALE, De Portibus Maris, in A TREATISE IN THREE PARTS (1675), reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF 
TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 45, 77–78 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1787). 
20 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). 
21 The history is briefly summarized in ROBERT B. HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM: THE 
DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 65–76 (1989). See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 17–21 (1990) (detailing the evolution of the regulatory state, 
from the writing of the Constitution to New Deal Constructionism). 
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In practice, most of the traditionally regulated industries were those providers of services 
thought essential to the economy, or in some other way raised public concerns, such as energy, 
transportation, telecommunications, banking and credit, medical services, alcohol and insurance.23  
The laws did not uniformly follow the same model.  Some of the regulatory regimes had explicitly 
pro-competitive goals that went beyond the Sherman Act—such as the Alcohol Administration 
Act,24 which has explicit competition mandates built into it.25  
 
From the 1970s through the 1990s, the basic regulatory industry paradigm changed 
dramatically in several ways.  First, a so-called deregulatory movement generally sought reductions or 
eliminations of regulations from the New Deal and placed more faith in competition.26  The full 
history of the deregulation movement is lengthy and complex, 27 but the principal criticism, made by 
Fred Kahn among others, was that competition was indeed possible in industries where it was 
thought hopeless, that natural monopoly had become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the industry 
might be at least partially deregulated without compromising public goals.28  This led, in main part, 
to laws or rulemakings abolishing controls on market entry and pricing, especially in the 
telecommunications, airline, trucking and rail industries.29 
 
Second, while sometimes confusingly described as deregulation, some agencies also began 
using regulation to promote competition.  This was a development with its origins at the Federal 
Communications Commission in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which sought, for example, to 
promote new technologies like VHF/UHF broadcasting and cable television as competitors to 
mainstream broadcasting, and sought to allow competition with the AT&T monopoly in long-
distance services and handsets.30  By the 1990s, as Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill would 
observe, in at least some agencies, “[t]he role of the agency has been transformed from one of 
protecting end users to one of arbitrating disputes among rival providers and, in particular, 
																																																								
23 See HORWITZ, supra note 21, at 71. 
24  Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201–205 (2012) (prohibiting, for example, vertical 
arrangements in which retailers must exclusively deal with certain wholesalers of alcoholic beverages). 
25 Id. § 205(a).  
26 RICHARD H. K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA 330 
(1994) (“What had changed most was the New Deal's fundamental premise, namely that competition was the problem. 
Now government itself was viewed as the problem-at best, a necessary evil.”). 
27 See generally REGULATORY ISSUES SINCE 1964: THE RISE OF THE DEREGULATION MOVEMENT (Robert F. 
Himmelberg ed., 1994) (providing insight into deregulation from several perspectives); MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. 
QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985) (detailing the historical background surrounding deregulation and 
explaining the political debate for deregulation reform); VIETOR, supra note 26 (addressing specific case studies relating 
to economic regulation). 
28 See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1971). See also RICHARD 
A. POSNER, NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION (1999) (discussing whether the concept of natural monopoly 
can justify the imposition of regulatory controls). 
29 See KAHN, supra note 28; see also POSNER, supra note 28. 
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overseeing access to and pricing of ‘bottleneck’ facilities that could be exploited by incumbent firms 
to stifle competition.”31    
 
 A Closer Look at the 1970s-90s 
 
A full canvasing of the efforts to catalyze competition would be beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Nonetheless, we can usefully learn from five well-known late-20th century statutes and one-
rulemaking as important landmarks in the first wave of pro-competitive laws: the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978, the FTC’s 1978 Eyeglass Rule, the Hatch-Waxman Act (enacted in 1986), 
and two FCC efforts:  the Carterfone regime and the 1996 Telecom Act.  Without claiming that these 
laws were necessarily the most economically significant, they each came to industries with known 
competition problems and used rules to try to improve the conditions of competition therein.32    
 
1. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was an important effort to remove regulatory 
barriers to entry.33  The act was the brainchild of economist and bureaucrat Alfred Kahn, and an 
early project of then-Congressional staffer Stephen Breyer.34  It is a complex statute; as relevant here, 
its most important aspect was the removal of constraints of entry and exit imposed by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (which was itself eliminated).35  The immediate impact of the law was to allow 
the market entrance of a series of low cost airlines like Southwest Airlines, People Express Airlines, 
and others, to challenge the existing carriers with lower priced flights.36  In the short term, the 
statute succeeded in its self-defined goal of increasing competition and saving consumers money.37  
																																																								
31 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 12, at 1326. 
32 There is, of course, an enormous amount of scholarship that has considered each of these statutes in depth 
and from various angles. The goal here is not to make any contribution to the debates surrounding these statutes, but to 
gain an understanding of the specific techniques used by each. See, e.g., STEVEN MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1986) (analyzing the effects of airline deregulation on both travelers 
and the airline industry); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1998), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/pharm.pdf  (examining the extent to 
which competition from generic drugs has increased since the Hatch-Waxman Act); ROBERT W. CRANDALL, 
COMPETITION AND CHAOS: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SINCE THE 1996 TELECOM ACT (2005) (arguing that the 1996 
Telecommunications Act inappropriately invited state and federal regulators to micromanage competitive entry into local 
telecommunications markets). 
33 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). 
34 Christopher DeMuth et al., Foreword to STEPHEN BREYER, ECONOMIC REASONING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, 
at vii (2004). 
35 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.  
36  Summer Airline Fare Skirmishes Begin, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 1981), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/15/business/summer-airline-fare-skirmishes-begin.html; Daniel F. Cuff, How To 
Start An Airline: People Express Poised To Fly, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 1981), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/26/business/how-to-start-an-airline-people-express-poised-to-
fly.html?pagewanted=all&mcubz=1.   
37 Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Airline Deregulation and Public Policy, 245 SCIENCE 707, 708 (1989) 
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The longer-term assessment is been more mixed, particularly after the major airlines consolidated 
into a small number of firms and displayed signs of oppressive oligopoly practices, such as 
coordinated pricing and degraded customer service.38 
 
2. The Hatch-Waxman Act (more formally, the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act), was an effort to trim some of the inherently anti-competitive aspects of 
FDA drug regulation and the U.S. patent system.39  It sought to allow generic drugs to reach the 
market as quickly as possible after the expiration of a patent, as opposed to being further delayed by 
many years of regulatory proceedings.40  It also tinkered with the patent system, giving patent owners 
some benefits, like a partial extension of the patent period to account for the time spent in the 
regulatory approval process, while also creating incentives for generic drug companies to invalidate 
bad patents.41     
 
The Hatch-Waxman is notable as an effort to diminish the anti-competitive effects of 
pervasive regulation, as opposed to effecting a complete or partial deregulation.  The Act’s rollout 
was, predictably, the subject of some short-term problems, and the implementation has perhaps not 
been a complete success—especially given the propensity of the generic and brand-name drug 
companies to collude to try and avoid its pro-competitive impact.42  As Scott Hemphill points out, 
aspects of the statute’s design made collusion attractive, by offering a clear bounty to the colluders, 
serving as a reminder that even regulatory efforts to catalyze competition can have unexpected 
consequences.43 
 
Nonetheless, even by 1994, the Congressional Budget Office was estimating billions in 
consumer savings, while investment in new drugs continued to rise.44  Since the passage of the act, 
the generic pharmaceutical association estimates that generic drugs have grown to become 88% of 
the prescribed drugs in the United States.45 The association found that $254 billion in savings in 
2014 can be attributed to generic pharmaceuticals, some amount of which must be attributed to the 
legislation.46 
																																																								
38  See A Lack of Competition Explains the Flaws in American Aviation, ECONOMIST (Apr. 22, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721201-americans-are-treated-abysmally-their-airlines-they-should-look-
europe-lessons-lack; Tim Wu, Why I Left United Airlines, NEW YORKER (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/leaving-united-airlines-after-merger.  
39 Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
40 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 187, 189–91 (1999). 
41 Id. 
42 C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV., 1553, 1562–77 (2006). 
43 Id. at 1578–95. 
44 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 32, at ix. 










3. The FCC’s Carterfone rule is a classic, and arguably the most successful example of a 
what we later call a “separation” rule.  AT&T, in the 1960s, enjoyed a “super-monopoly” that 
encompassed multiple, adjoining markets, including local telephony, long-distance, handsets, and 
various associated services.47  The services were “tied”—one could not buy local service without also 
getting an AT&T telephone.48  Seeking to promote competition in the sale of handsets, the FCC 
required that AT&T create a standardized wall-jack into which any telephone could be plugged, 
regardless of whether it was produced by the Bell system.49   
 
The Bell system, which has a storied history of resistance to pro-competitive laws, fought the 
standard phone jack.50  Most scholars agree however, that the standardized jack—a separation rule—
was one of the most successful competition catalysts.51  Over time, it not only yielded more 
competition in telephone handsets, but led to increased innovation in the attachment market, which 
had been carefully controlled by AT&T.52  The years after the adoption of the standardized jack 
yielded technologies including the answering machine, fax machine, and the home modem, among 
other inventions.53  Meanwhile, based on those technologies, entire new industries grew, such as 
popular “dial-up” network on the model of AOL or Compuserve, which in turn served as the 
backbone of the popular Internet.   In short, the standardized phone jack was, arguably, the spark 
that yielded a massive, and economically defining quality of newly unplugged innovation. 
 
The most important point that can be drawn from the success of the Carterfone rule is that 
the most successful rulemakings will see their significance not the competition they introduce in the 
targeted industry (in this case, the market for physical telephones) but by easing barriers to market 
entry in related markets or even new markets unknown at the time of regulation.  In Schumpeterian 
terms, the best rulemakings don’t just spark competition within the industry, but rather set the table 
for the birth of entirely new industries which may even come to destroy the original target.54   Of 
course, predicting that such a thing will happen is not exactly easy, given that we live and regulate in 
the present, but the potential must be kept in mind.  
 
																																																								
47 THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 49, at 304–05. See generally Tim Wu, The Super Monopoly (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
48  JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 62–63 (2005).  
49 See id. at 138–40. 
50 Id. at 58–59 (resistance coming in the form of requiring what was called a “protective coupling” device). 
51 Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT’L J. OF COMM. 389, 395–97 (2007) [hereinafter Wireless Carterfone].  See also 
Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve Various Outstanding Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Commc’ns Assistance for Law 
Enf’t Act, RM-10865, Comments of the Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. (Apr. 12, 2004). 
52 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 82.  
53 Wireless Carterfone, supra note 85.    
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4. The most notable failure dating from the 70s–90s was the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act’s unbundling rules.  The 1996 Act itself was a successor to a long series of pro-competitive FCC 
rulemakings and the 1984 AT&T antitrust decree.55  At the time it was billed as an effort to 
introduce competitive forces into every part of the telecommunications industry, “to let any 
communications business compete in any market against any other.”56   Unlike Hatch-Waxman, the 
Telecommunications Act was targeted not at a regulatory barrier to entry, but a private barrier: the 
monopolized bottleneck that is the “last-mile” of copper telephone lines connecting homes and 
businesses to the telephone network. The Act, in that sense, looked much like an antitrust remedy 
regime backed into a statute.  That it was designed to replace the consent decree, which had 
governed the Bell System since 1984, may help explain the Act’s purpose.57 
 
The Act was exceptionally complex, but its central remedy was understood to its effort to 
promote competition in local communications services, the historic core of the AT&T monopoly.  
The most dramatic remedy was its unbundling, or shared facilities, regime that allowed companies to 
lease the local Bell Company’s lines at an extremely reasonable price, so as to provide their own 
service over those lines.58 In theory, the premise was that the consumer would choose between a 
number of competing resellers of telephone and perhaps broadband services, all of whom were in 
fact relying on the same underlying wires.59  Despite sharing the same infrastructure, differential 
competition would come in matters of price, marketing, and additional services provided.60  The law 
promised a golden age of competition in an industry that hadn’t seen much of it. 
 
Things didn’t work as planned, and by the early 2000s the Act was being widely decried as a 
failure.61 By then, the new firms that had relied on the Act to provide new services had nearly all 
been destroyed by the Bells, who has also seized the opportunity to remerge back into just a few 
																																																								
55 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom.; Maryland v. United 
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).  
56 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, FCC (June 20, 2013), https://www.fcc.gov/general/telecommunications-
act-1996. For the statute in full, see Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 47 U.S.C.). 
57 TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 244 (2010) [hereinafter 
THE MASTER SWITCH]. 
58 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 251. 
59  See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 20–26 (1999) 
(describing the regulatory design of unbundling and other remedies).  
60 Id. 
61  See generally Lawrence Gasman, Why The Telecommunications Act is Failing, CATO INST., (Jan. 6, 1997), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-telecommunications-act-is-failing (arguing that Congress should 
revisit the 1996 Act); Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act: Deregulation Before Meaningful Competition Spells Consumer 
Disaster, CONSUMERS UNION (Feb. 2000), http://consumersunion.org/pdf/lesson.pdf [hereinafter Lessons from 1996 
Telecommunications Act] (finding that the 1996 Act incorrectly deregulated cable television). See also Gene Kimmelman, 
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large firms.62  Nonetheless, with the passage of time, the harsh assessments of the law have come to 
seem overstated.  Viewed as a whole, the Act did have numerous provisions that were arguably 
successful: for example, telephone companies were allowed to enter the cable industry, and did, and 
cable companies to enter telephony (which they did as well).  It also created useful tools, like 
“forbearance” authority, which allows the agency to hold back aspects of regulation that it sees as 
unnecessary, so as to make possible so called “light touch” regulation.63  That authority was used, for 
example, during the 2015 Net Neutrality rulemaking.64  It cannot be denied, however, that the 
feature billed as the main act—the unbundling—was a bust. 
 
There are two main explanations as to why the unbundling rules failed.  The first tends to 
place the blame on Congress for naively believing that a regulatory unbundling scheme could 
produce competition and blames the FCC for implementing the law in too aggressive a manner.65  
This theory also asserts that the unbundling rules prevented “real” competitive entry, that is, entry 
based on investments in new infrastructure.66   Another camp believes that the law was sound in 
principle, noting the success of similar laws in Europe,67 but blames the phone companies for 
thwarting the law.68  For example, the Consumers Union alleged that the Bells “refused to open their 
markets by dragging their feet in allowing competitors to interconnect, refusing to negotiate in good 
faith, litigating every nook and cranny of the law, and avoiding head-to-head competition like the 
plague.”69  This explanation also blames regulators for not cracking down more severely on the Bells 
for their misfeasance.70  The two conclusions may not be inconsistent: it is certainly possible that the 
law was too optimistic, that is, if you accept that the industry would be determined to resist the law, 
and have enough litigation and lobbying resources to do so effectively.    
 
We may generalize the point.  Competition catalysts, if successful, will result in lost profits 
for the previously dominant firms and gains by competitors or new entrants.   Hence, if not 
particularly good citizenship on their part, dominant firms apparently see it worthwhile to invest in 
efforts to delay, defeat or nullify any efforts to spark competition in their industry, as the Bells did 
with the unbundling rules.  The upshot is that, as in tax policy or criminal law, a predictable level of 
																																																								
62 THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 49, at 238–55.  
63 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2012). 
64  See generally Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Dkt. No. 14–28, Report & Order on Remand, 
Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter Open Internet Order].  
65  Introduction to THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGE: CHANGING TECHNOLOGIES AND EVOLVING 
POLICIES 16 (Charles W. Wessner ed., 2006). 
66 Robert W. Crandall, Allan T. Ingraham & Hal J. Singer, Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based 
Investment, 4 B.E. J. OF ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 3 (2004). 
67 See NEXT GENERATION CONNECTIVITY: A REVIEW OF BROADBAND INTERNET TRANSITIONS AND POLICY 
FROM AROUND THE WORLD 84 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y at Harv. U. ed., 2010) (describing success of 
unbundling regimes in other countries). 
68 See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, Competition and Investment in Wireline Broadband, in . . . AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR 
ALL: A POLICY AGENDA FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION 81, 87–90 (Amit M. Schejter ed., 2009).  
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investment in forms of evasion, avoidance and legal challenge strategies must be taken into account 
in the design of competition catalysts. 71 
 
5. A final example, serving as an important contrast to the 1996 Telecom Act is the  
FTC’s 1977 eyeglass rules (otherwise known as the Ophthalmic Practice Rules or "Prescription 
Release Rule”).72  Optometrists had long formally or informally tied the provision of eye-
examinations with the sale of glasses.73  The doctors either sold an eye-examination and eye-glasses 
as a bundle, refused to release prescriptions, or charged a fee for the release of the prescription so as 
to discourage buying eyeglasses from an unaffiliated party. 74  The FTC, in a rulemaking, required the 
optometrist to provide a prescription, with which the consumer could then patronize the glasses 
provider of choice, including those providing less costly alternatives.75  Here are critical parts of the 
eyeglass rule, which describes itself as a “separation” rule: 
 
It is an unfair act or practice for an ophthalmologist or optometrist to: 
 
(a) Fail to provide to the patient one copy of the patient's prescription 
immediately after the eye examination is completed. . . .  
 
(b) Condition the availability of an eye examination to any person on a 
requirement that the patient agree to purchase any ophthalmic goods from the 
ophthalmologist or optometrist.76 
 
The rule was such a success that it is more or less taken for granted, and seems to require 
only limited amounts of ongoing enforcement, which perhaps is the best evidence of a successful 
rule.77  Like the 1996 Act, there was a duty was imposed on the industry, but one key source of 






71 Cf. Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 691–95 (2003) (describing investments in tools of legal 
avoidance). 
72 Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, 43 Fed. Reg. 23,992 (June 2, 1978) (to be codified at 16 
C.F.R. pt. 456). 
73 Id. at 23,998. 
74 Id. 
75 Separation of Examination and Dispensing, 16 C.F.R. § 456.2 (2017). 
76 Id. 
77 The FTC did send out 38 warning letters in 2016, suggesting some industry resistance. FTC, FTC Issues 









Viewing the comparative fate of these regimes provides a good initial opportunity to discuss 
some of the lessons that can be drawn from the efforts made through the 70s through 90s.  The first 
lesson is obvious only on reflection: that laws reducing regulatory barriers to entry may often be 
more easily effective than those reducing private barriers to entry.  This follows because the 
regulatory barrier lies directly within the government’s control, while the private barriers require 
forcing or encouraging a private company do something it inherently does not want to (namely, face 
more competition). 
 
Second, the failure of the 1996 unbundling rules might be said to confirm the idea that 
anticompetitive efforts, and government generally, may do better with “thou shall nots” than “thou 
shalls”—imposing prohibitions instead of affirmative duties.78  But this conclusion may easily be 
taken too far.  As Carterfone and the eyeglass rule suggests, it isn’t true that affirmative duties 
designed to create competition are inherently doomed.  It is, rather, that they must be very well 
designed.  There needs to be a simple and standardized measure of success, and ideally one that is in 
some important way “self-executing”—its compliance is open and obvious, and might even be 
policed by consumers themselves. 
 
Third, and finally, the success of Carterfone suggests that the holy grail – rarely achieved – is 
not always sparking competition in the targeted industry, but promoting the growth of entirely new 
industries that are in their infancy or undreamed of at the time of regulation.   That is is, of course, 
easier said than done, but may in the long run be more important than introducing price 
competition in a targeted industry. 
 
II. Theory & Taxonomy 
 
 Having considered a few of the earlier efforts in this area, we might take a step back, and try 
to describe the mechanism by which pro-competitive laws operate. Whatever their particular form, 
the catalysts of competition can be understood to come back to one simple mechanism: reducing 
the costs of being a competitor. 
 
In their classic 1983 paper, “Raising Rivals Costs,” Steven Salop and David T. Scheffman 
observed that among the easiest ways for a dominant firm to reduce competition is to raise the costs 
of its rivals, or competitors, using any means necessary.79   Competition catalysts can be understood 
																																																								
78 Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 15, 43 (2006). 
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as following the inverse of the same logic: increasing competition by reducing the costs faced by 
would-be competitors.    
 
Here are some of the original examples of costs that Salop and Scheffman thought a firm 
might profitably try to raise for its rivals: 
 
A variety of exclusionary practices can be characterized as conduct that raises rivals' 
costs. . . . Inducing suppliers to discriminate against rivals is a less extreme variant of 
the same conduct. Similarly, according to Oliver Williamson's analysis of the 
Pennington case, an industry-wide wage contract raised the costs of the labor 
intensive competitive fringe more than it raised the costs of the more capital-
intensive dominant firms. 
 
If there are scale economies or other entry barriers in retailing, exclusive dealing 
arrangements can raise small rivals' costs of distribution. As emphasized in the rent-
seeking literature, product standards and other government regulations can raise 
rivals' relative compliance costs. Advertising expenditures and R & D races can also 
be used to raise rivals' costs. For example, suppose that increased advertising 
expenditures initiated by the most efficient advertiser must be matched in effective 
intensity by less efficient rivals.   Advertising strategy might be profitable even absent 
the demand increasing effect of the advertising. Disadvantaging competitors can 
provide a benefit that exceeds its costs, if the strategy allows the dominant firm to 
increase price or market share.80 
 
As the paper suggests, in any market there are various costs of either being a competitor or 
of bringing a product to market.  (The phrase “barrier to entry” usually refers to the latter cost).  
Among others, it may be necessary to encourage consumers to endure the costs of switching from 
one firm to another, to license intellectual property, to gain access to wholesale distribution or retail 
space, or to advertise sufficiently to gain consumer attention.  The higher these costs of competition, 
all else being equal, the less contested the market will be, and vice versa.  A competition catalyst is, 
therefore, simply any regulation or modality which reduces a given cost of competing in a given 
market for one or more competitors.   
  
 If we allow that a competition catalyst or pro-competitive law be defined by reducing a cost 
of competition, it follows that we can understand or taxonomize the major types by which cost they 
reduce.  The taxonomy is also a reaction to the fact that much of the current language used in this 
area is extremely confusing.  This probably stems from the fact that, owing to the history of the 
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regulated industries law, there exists a false association with the idea of government action and of 
the hindrance or blocking of competition.  This misconception has led to confusions when, for 
example, the phrase “deregulation” is used to refer to the enactment of more, albeit pro-
competitive, regulations.81 
 
 What is most needed is a better vocabulary for talking about pro-competitive laws and 
regulation.   What follows is an initial effort that is not necessarily comprehensive, but may be useful 
in understanding the taxonomy.  It works by categorizing pro-competitive laws based on the 
“target” of the rule, that is, the barrier to competition that the law seeks to deal with.   
 
Table 1.  A Taxonomy of Competition Catalysts 
 
Nickname    Target    Examples 
Separation Rules    Industry Tie-ins  Carterfone, Eyeglasses 
Deregulation    Regulatory Barriers  Airline Deregulation 
Switching Cost Reducers  Switching Costs  Number Portability  
Price-Transparency Rules  Lack of Information  Airline Prices 
Equalizers     Integration, Scale  Common Carriage, NN, Beer 
Patent Reducers   Patents   FRANDs, Hatch-Waxman82 
 
 
1. Separation Rules (Quarantines or Tie-breakers) 
   
It is not unusual for an industry or firm with power in one product market to try to control 
or dominate adjacent markets.83  In antitrust language, one means of trying to do so is called the 
“tying arrangement,”84 which is part of a broad category of efforts to use power in one market to 
gain it in another known as “monopoly leveraging.”85  A tying arrangement exists when a firm, one 
way or another, forces the customer who wants product A to also buy product B as well.  The tying 
arrangement is a very close relative to the “integrated product” and “the bundle”—the common 
																																																								
81 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 12, at 1324–25.  
82 The patent reducers are not considered at length in this paper. 
83 See, e.g., Annabelle Gawer & Michael A. Cusumano, How Companies Become Platform Leaders, 49 MIT SLOAN 
MGMT. REV. 28, 30–31 (2008) (describing how dominant companies, such as Google and Qualcomm, have used their 
single market dominance to expand into alternate markets). 
84 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958) (“For our purposes a tying arrangement may be 
defined as an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different 
(or tied) product . . . .”). 
85 See Robin C. Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2079 (1999) (defines leveraging as 
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point being that one way or another, two or more products are combined in some way and sold as 
one, often to the detriment of competitors in one of the markets.86 
 
 Separation rules or “tie-breakers” are efforts to encourage competition by preventing firms 
from forcing or pressuring consumers from taking two or more products instead of one.  Whether 
in the face of a long-term sustained monopoly, or an industry-wide practice,87 the rule promotes 
competition in adjacent or attached markets by “breaking” the tie, or separating the markets.88  
When done right, as we shall see, the separation rule can be a very effective and important spur to 
competition. 
 
Successful and Failed Separation Rules. 
 
 The grand success of the Carterfone and Eyeglass rules, described earlier, led the FCC, FTC 
and other agencies to other efforts to duplicate the approach, with varied levels of success.  For 
example, the contact lens industry is governed by FTC regulations similar to the eyeglass rules, albeit 
provided by statute.89  Eye doctors are, as with the eyeglass rule, required to give the consumer a 
prescription after an examination without extra charge, with which the customer can use to shop 
around for the best deal.90  The contact lens rules can be described as a qualified success – while not 
a failure, they have, overall, been less effective in promoting competition for a number of reasons.91  
For one thing, the law was unable to mandate a prescription system with the same simplicity as the 
eyeglass rules.  Ostensibly for reasons of consumer protection, the law tolerates the writing of 
prescriptions that expire every year (requiring, of course, another trip to the eye-doctor) and are 
brand specific.92  Second, the optometrists, for whatever reasons, have a greater tendency to resist 
and violate the contact lens rules by not issuing prescriptions or falsely denying requests to verify 
prescriptions.93  In 2016, in recognition of these problems, the FTC proposed new rules that aimed 
																																																								
86 As antitrust lawyers define a “bundle,” the consumer has the option of buying the constituent products 
separately and if the product is considered integrated, then, technically, there is no tie between the two products. See 
David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying 
Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 37 (2005); Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 39 (1984) (O’Conner, J. 
concurring) (describing the necessity of two products for an actionable tying claim).    
87 Cf. C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013) (proposing the recognition of 
parallel exclusion as a form of monopolization). 
88See supra Section II.1. 
89 See Fairness to Contact Lens Consumers, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7601–7610 (2012); Contact Lens Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 
315 (2017). 
90 Fairness to Contact Lens Consumers § 7601. 
91 See Christopher Versace, The FTC Finally Sees The Light On Contact Lenses, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2017, 3:29 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisversace/2017/01/17/the-ftc-finally-sees-the-light-on-contact-
lenses/#75c347516dde (arguing the rule has been less than effective with the FTC suing businesses like 1-800 Contacts 
and effectively protecting brick and mortar retailers from competition). 
92 16 C.F.R. §§ 315.2 –315.6. 
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at tougher enforcement of the existing rules.94  As this suggests, even relatively simple separation 
schemes may require at least some level of public oversight. 
 
Meanwhile, the FCC has also tried more than once to replicate its winning Carterfone 
approach for cable set-top boxes.  The goal has been to break the tying arrangement between the 
cable operator’s lines and the converter boxes that are usually found on top of a television set (the 
“set-top box”). By requiring that consumers use the boxes provided by the cable company, the 
industry earns an estimated $7 billion per year, making a good case for a separation rule.95 
Unfortunately, the first generation of those rules serves as a caricature of a failed separation regime.    
 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act mandated that the FCC develop a regime to separate the 
set-top box from cable service.96 The rule instructed the FCC to “adopt regulations to assure the 
commercial availability . . . of converter boxes, interactive communications equipment, and other 
equipment used by consumers to access . . . [cable television].”97  Working with industry, moving 
slowly the FCC in 2003 promulgated the “CableCARD” regime.98   
 
 The CableCARD was, and is, a specialized physical card that a consumer requests from the 
cable company and plugs into a device which then functions as a competing set-top box.99  For 
example, TiVo sells a competing set-top box with special functionality.100  The customer pays a 
monthly fee for the service of around $14.99.101  The card is sent in the mail or obtained through a 
visit to the operator’s office.102 
 
Unfortunately, the rule failed to introduce notable competition into the set-top box market.  
As with the unbundling rules, the cable industry’s foot-dragging, litigation, law-breaking and outright 
sabotage did not exactly help matters.103  By 2009, the FCC had admitted that the regime had failed 
																																																								
94 Contact Lens Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,526 (proposed Dec. 7, 2016) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 315).  
95 Ex Parte from TiVo Inc., Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, CS Docket No. 97-80, PP Docket No. 00-67, MB Docket Nos.12-328, 14-16, & 14-42, CSR-8740-Z, CSR-
8876-Z, 1 (Mar. 27, 2014), available at https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521095660.pdf [hereinafter TiVo Ex Parte]. 
96 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 304; see Competitive Availability of Navigation Devices, 47 U.S.C. § 
549(a) (2012). 
97 47 U.S.C. § 549(a).  
98 Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices and Compatibility Between Cable Systems and Consumer 
Electronics Equipment, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,734 (Nov. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 15 & 76).  
99  Digital Cable Compatibility: CableCARD-Ready Devices, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/reports-
research/guides/digital-cable-compatibility-cablecard-ready-devices (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
100 User Experience, TIVO, https://business.tivo.com/products-solutions/ux.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
101 Service Plans, TIVO, https://www.tivo.com/buytivo/popups/popup_servicePlans.html (last visited Oct. 6, 
2017). 
102 See CableCARD: Know Your Rights, FCC (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/media/cablecard-know-your-
rights. See also FAQs: About CableCARDTM Decoders, TIVO, 
https://www.tivo.com/buytivo/faqs/about_cablecarddecoders (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).  
103 See Harold Feld, My Insanely Long Field Guide to the War on CableCARD — Part I: More Background Than You 
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(or more precisely, it admitted that “The Commission's CableCARD rules have resulted in limited 
success in developing a retail market for navigation devices.").104  Unlike the phone jack or an 
eyeglass prescription, it seems that most consumers have no idea what the CableCARD is, let alone 
know how to ask for one; and only a few vendors tried to make use of the rule.105  The fact that it 
must be known about, requested, paid for (through a monthly fee) and that its provisioning is within 
the control of the industry who may simply refuse to provide the card, or otherwise make it hard to 
get, make it not at all surprising that the regime failed.106  The clearest measure of the CableCARD’s 
failure is the fact that the market for set-top boxes remains at some $20 billion per year, with cable 
companies controlling over 99% of the market in every jurisdiction.107  And the FCC’s 2016 effort to 
improve on CableCARD with a new rule was successfully blocked by the cable industry and its 
allies.108 
 
The Importance of Clean Cuts 
 
With these examples in hand, we can continue our discussion of when separation rules 
succeed or fail.  First, as the adage goes “when butchering, you need to cut at the joint, not at the 
bones.”  The tie-breakers that have been most successful make a cut between two things that are 
identifiably or obviously separate products and services, whether by tradition, or based on the 
physical properties of the products or services involved.  We can see that the eyeglass rule, by 
making the cut between the service (examination) and the product (the glasses) came away with 








insanely-long-field-guide-to-the-war-on-cablecard-part-i-more-background-than-you-can-possibly-imagine/; TiVo Ex 
Parte, supra note 94. 
104 Comment Sought on Video Device Innovation, GN Dkt. Nos. 09-47, 09-51, 09-137, CS Dkt. No. 97-80, Public 
Notice, 24 FCC Rcd. 14,280, 4 (2009), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-2519A1.doc.  
105 See Nate Anderson, FCC Admits CableCARD a Failure, Vows to Try Something Else, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 
2009, 10:38 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/12/fcc-admits-cablecard-a-failure-vows-to-try-something-
else. 
106 See id.; see also Shiva Stella, Finding from Senators Markey, Blumenthal Highlight Need for Cable Box Reform, PUBLIC 
KNOWLEDGE (July 30, 2015), https://www.publicknowledge.org/press-release/findings-from-senators-markey-
blumenthal-highlight-need-for-cable-box-refor.  
107 See Expanding Consumer’s Video Navigation Choices and Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, MB Dkt. No. 
16-42, CS Dkt. No. 97-80, Report & Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 1544, (2016) (Statement of Commissioner Mignon L. 
Clyburn), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-18A3.pdf. 
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Fig 1. Cuts Need to be Clean 
 









In contrast, the 1996 Telecom Act’s unbundling rules, in most of their variations, created an 
unclean cut.  The product created was a prescribed mixture of the incumbent carrier’s product and 
the competitors’ product.109  The creation necessarily left the incumbent with power over its 
competitor’s product delivery, a position that they repeatedly exploited.110  The CableCARD regime, 
similarly, produced a regime where the consumer needed to deal with the incumbent in order to gain 
access to a competing product. 
 
The cleanness of the cut is not the only issue, for as we’ve discussed before, industry 
resistance makes an enormous difference.  The Bell companies engaged in exceptional, outlandish, 
and illegal resistance to the mandates of the 1996 Act, and the cable companies were nearly as 
resolute in their resistance to the CableCARD.111  This isn’t to say that regulators should surrender 
to industry resistance.  But it does mean, as stated above, that separation rules must take into 
account the incentive and the ability of the incumbent to sabotage, delay, or otherwise make the 
scheme ineffective.     
 
How effective lawbreaking will be also depends on the design of the regime.  At the risk of 
belaboring the point, a key difference between the (successful) phone jack and the (failed) 
CableCARD regimes is that the phone jack allowed the competing phone manufacturer and the 
consumer to have a direct, non-intermediated relationship.  The CableCARD left the cable company 
with an intermediary role, which, predictably, stunted the relationship.  It was as if, following a 
divorce proceeding, the former spouse remained in the house. 
 
																																																								
109 To be sure, such mixed products have been successful in other contexts—consider Spotify or Netflix’s Red 
envelopes—but in those cases there were existing horizontal divisions inherent in the design of the mail system of 
Internet. 
110 See generally THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 49, at ch. 18. 
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Second, it is worth returning to the question of what is demanded of consumers.   The 
prescription script generated by the eyeglass rule was easy to understand and use. The standardized 
telephone jack and left the consumer with nothing to do but buy a telephone and plug it in.  In 
contrast, other rules like the cable set-top box rule and the mobile phone handset rules have 
required some set of complex unlocking procedures that typically depend on calling an incumbent to 
help out, which it has limited interest in doing.  When a pro-competitive scheme depends on 
affirmative action by the incumbent for its success, one may predict less success. 
 
The rule of thumb, therefore is this: an effective separation rule, and the standard involved, 
must eliminate, to the extent possible, any active role played by the incumbent in the relationship 
between the consumer and a would-be consumer.      
 
2. Deregulation: Pro-competitive Removal of Regulatory Barriers 
 
Some of the most effective pro-competitive laws work by eliminating or reducing regulatory 
barriers to entry.  The word “deregulation” is usually used in this context, though sometimes in very 
confusing ways.   It is important to distinguish between pro-competitive deregulation—which is 
targeted specifically at catalyzing competition—and deregulation generally.  Weakening or 
eliminating public protections and consumer protection measures may be deregulatory, but not 
necessarily in the pro-competitive manner meant here.  For example, reducing emissions 
requirements for automakers would save the industry money, but not make it more competitive in 
any obvious way. 
 
The classic example of pro-competitive deregulation was, as we’ve already seen, the 1978 
Airline Deregulation Act, which eliminated existing constraints imposed by the Civil Aeronautics 
Board on market entry and exit.112  A more recent example is the FDA’s 2016 effort to open the 
market in hearing aids.113  Hearing aids have long required an examination and fitting process, and 
the aids are usually sold in a bundle with the examination.114  The market is occupied by an oligopoly 
of providers, and the prices are high, as compared to the costs of other electronics.115  According to 
PCAST, a 2014 survey found that the average price of one hearing aid was $2,363, with premium 
models costing $2,898; given that most people require two hearing aids, the prices are in the $4,700–
$5,600 range.116  Despite rapid decreases in the prices of comparable electronic devices, there has 
																																																								
112 Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).  
113 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Steps to Improve Hearing Aid Accessibility (Dec. 7, 
2016), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm532005.htm. 
114  PRES. COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT ON AGING AMERICAN & HEARING LOSS: 
IMPERATIVE OF IMPROVED TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2015), 
http://hearingloss.org/sites/default/files/docs/PCAST_Hearing_Tech_LetterReport_FINAL.pdf.  
115 Id. at 2. 
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been little price reduction or innovation in hearing aids.117  The high price, apparently, has 
discouraged usage of hearing aids: PCAST estimates that only 15-30% of people who need hearing 
aids actually get them.118 
 
In December 2016, pursuant to the Competitive Initiative, the FDA announced that “it does 
not intend to enforce the requirement that individuals 18 and up receive a medical evaluation or sign 
a waiver prior to purchasing most hearing aids,” and that the FDA had a committed to “consider 
creating a category of over-the-counter (OTC) hearing aids that could deliver new, innovative and 
lower-cost products to millions of consumers.”119  The rulemakings are not yet complete, but the 
pro-competitive, deregulatory logic intrinsic to the effort should be obvious. 
 
Some pro-competitive deregulation seeks not to eliminate but lessen the burden on 
competitors.  The Hatch-Waxman Act, discussed above, did not eliminate the FDA, but did make it 
easier for generics to get drugs to market, through the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA).120  
It carefully limited, without eliminating, the FDA’s power to slow market entry. 
 
The greatest concern surrounding pro-competitive deregulation must be that which 
accompanies any deregulatory action.  It is the weakening of the protections for the public that 
(hopefully) motivated regulation in the first place, whether concerns of public safety, consumer 
protection, or the systemic stability of the industry or the broader economy.  The danger, in other 
words, is that under the banner of “increased competition” regulators may be persuaded to weaken 
important protections.121 
 
There are also potentially unforeseeable dangers from deregulating part, but not all, of an 
industry.  Here, the well-known partial deregulation of the California energy market provides one 
example of the dangers of a purportedly pro-competitive regime.122  In that case, hoping to increase 
competition in the generation of electricity, the State forced the divestiture of some 20% of 
generating capacity, deregulated wholesale pricing, while retaining a monopolized retail delivery and 
pricing.123  The setup was quickly abused by opportunistic wholesalers, especially Enron, who 
created artificial shortages so as to drive wholesale pricing through the roof.124  The consequence 
																																																								
117 Id. at 2. 
118 Id. at 1. 
119 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 112.  
120 Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
121  Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO 
DEPRESSION (2009). 
122 The Electric Utility Industry Restructuring Act, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330 (1996). 
123 Id. 
124 See Hearings on Examining Enron: Electricity Manipulation and the Effect on the Western States Before the Subcomm. on 
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was the near-collapse of the California energy utility, PG&E, enormous public costs, and a lesson in 
the dangers of partial deregulation.125 
 
The California deregulation scheme was an exceptionally bad design, but it should not be 
taken as dictating that it is impossible to have deregulation of the anti-competitive aspects of a 
regime without destroying other public protections.  For example, the Hatch-Waxman Act, while 
promoting competition, has not resulted in the collapse of the prescription drug system, nor has it 
led to an abandoned public safety regime.  The latter point is important:  for there was no 
assumption by the drafters of Hatch-Waxman that competition would somehow, magically, take 
care of public safety issues.    
 
The lesson that might be taken from this area is this: that pro-competitive deregulation can 
be extremely effective in introducing competition, but that competition goals should be seen as 
separate from public safety or consumer protection concerns.  Indeed, the introduction of lower-
cost competitors may sometimes require expanded protections for the public. 
 
3. Switching Cost Reducers  
 
Switching costs are a barrier to competition because they require that a competitor not just 
be slightly better, but quite a bit better to compensate for the costs incurred in changing providers.  
(Hence, Geico’s injunction to switch insurance providers: “15 minutes could save you 15% or 
more”).126  This is particularly the case for businesses where the customer has a long-term, 
dependent relationship, such as one might have with an accountant, family physician or an airline.  A 
sense of the importance of switching costs can be understood by thinking of the difference between 
switching one’s cable company with deciding to patronize a new restaurant. 
 
Companies are well aware of the importance of switching costs.  New entrants or companies 
in the competitive fringe often undertake promotions that try to lower the costs of switching in 
various ways.  Meanwhile, those with large customer bases usually try to increase switching costs in 
ways subtle or less so.  Many companies make it difficult to quit, or ensure that it will take 
considerable time and effort to return to previous levels of comfort.  They may require multiple 
steps to cancel an account, including a phone call, a personal visit to the local office or similar 
measures.  The loss of something important—like a well-known phone number or a list of 
contacts—may also discourage switching, as do long-term loyalty programs, like the frequent flier 
programs of airlines. 
 
																																																								
125 See generally PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE UNSUSTAINABLE COSTS OF PARTIAL DEREGULATION, ch. 4 (2007). 
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Pro-competitive regulation in this area usually consists of trying to isolate the source of 
switching costs and then reduce them through regulation.  Arguably the most successful effort in 
this area has been the “number portability” rules adopted by the FCC for the mobile phone 
market.127  Boiled down, the rules require that consumers be allowed to “bring along” their numbers 
when they change service providers—so that a number, say 202-421-5445 may follow you as you 
switch from Verizon to AT&T to T-Mobile and so on.  The premise is that losing one’s number 
represents a switching cost that the regulation eliminates.  Portability is broadly relied on by 
consumers; and the estimated savings to consumers in terms of lower prices offered by the lower-
cost “mavericks” T-Mobile and Sprint have been estimated in the billions.128   Meanwhile, while hard 
to measure, some of the significance of the portability rules may lie in promoting the growth of 
wireless telephony, as a whole, as a competitor to wireline telephony. 
 
The tool of reducing switching costs through regulation or encouraging best-practices is not, 
at present widely used, outside of the telephone context.  However, it may be of increasing 
importance in an era where people store large parts of their personal information (email 
correspondence, photos, lists of friends) online.129  Consider, for example, if you wanted to stop 
using Google, Gmail, and associated companies for whatever reason.  How difficult would it be to 
access and “port” to all of your photos, emails and so on?  If you wanted to quit Facebook for a 
competitor, can you bring along your network of friends?  As it stands, data portability is the subject 
of only voluntary regimes which are sometimes quite limited in their scope.  Given the financial 
importance of the major platforms and relative dearth of competition, it is not impossible to imagine 
data portability rules, modeled on number portability rules, specifically designed to reduce switching 
costs. 
 
4. Leveling the Playing Field / Common Carrier Regulation 
 
The advantages of economies of scale, vertical integration, and control over distribution or 
retail channels have obvious implications for competition in nearly every industry.  Regulatory 
“equalizers,” or facility rules are rules that mandate anti-discrimination and create a level playing 
field for those who depend on the facility. 
 
The antidiscrimination aspects of the old common carrier rules adopted for a variety of 
transportation technologies, from freight trains through canals, can be understood as the ancestor to 
																																																								
127 47 C.F.R. § 52.20 (1996). 
128 New Report Finds Efficient Number Portability Saved U.S. Consumers Billions of Dollars, NEUSTAR (Mar. 8, 2013), 
https://www.neustar.biz/about-us/news-room/press-releases/2013/report-finds-efficient-number-portability-saved-us-
consumers-billions.  
129 Alexander MacGillivray & Jay Shambaugh, Exploring Data Portability, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 30, 2016, 
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facility rules.  Common carrier rules have the purpose and effect of requiring the carrier to treat all 
customers equally and transparently—whether at the consumer level, or at the producer level.130    
 
Consider two competing oil refineries S and C, who need reach their retailers by train.   In 
the absence of common carrier rules, S can cut a deal with the railroad to carry his freight for less 
and C’s for more, thereby raising C’s costs of competition, even if C has a better or cheaper product.  
As antitrust aficionados will recognize, this was one one of the strategies undertaken by Standard Oil 
to maintain its monopoly over oil refining.131  Under a common carriage regime, where the trains are 
required to carry freight at the same rates for all customers, S and C’s competition depends more on 
the relative merits of their products. 
 
The most obvious modern manifestation of such rules are the Net Neutrality rules first 
proposed in the early 21st century for Internet carriage.132  The basic idea behind the Net Neutrality 
rules was to require the main Internet carriers not to discriminate as between the senders of 
information over the Internet, and not accept payment for faster carriage.133   As such, among the 
goals of the Net Neutrality rules has been to promote competition on the merits, and a Darwinian 
innovation policy.134   
 
Another historic example of an effort to level a playing field are the state and federal rules 
governing competition in the alcohol industries.  Both the federal government and most states have 
rules that seek to protect the economic independence of producers, retailers and distributors of 
alcoholic beverages.135  As such, the rules largely prevent any one company from using its power at 
one vertical level of the economy to influence competition in other layers—so that, for example, 
InterBev, the dominant beer brewer, may not bribe retailers to ensure carriage of only their brands, 
at the expense of smaller competitors (like craft beer).136  
 
At their best, these kind of rules can promote the kind of Schumpeterian innovation 
described earlier, by creating a platform from which new firms or indeed entirely new industries 
might get started.   The Net Neutrality policies and rules, which protected the Internet as an 
innovation platform, are arguably the most successful of such rules over the early 21st century. 
																																																								
130 See ICC v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 275 (1892) (“[T]he principles of the common law applicable to 
common carriers . . . demand[s] little more than that they should carry for all persons who applied, in the order in which 
the goods were delivered at the particular station, and that their charges for transportation should be reasonable.”). 
131 See Eliot Jones, The Trust Problem in the United States 72-77 (1921). 
132 See original proposal in Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 
L. 141 (2003). 
133 Id. 
134 See id. 
135 Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201–205 (2012). An overview of some of the laws can be 
found in Roni Elias, Three Cheers for Three Tiers: Why the Three-Tier System Maintains Its Legal Validity and Social Benefits After 
Granholm, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 209 (2015). 
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5. Truth-in-Pricing Rules 
 
Price transparency rules are different than some of the others discussed in this paper, 
because they do not necessarily reduce the costs of competition, rather, they try to prevent 
distortions in the competitive process created by drip pricing, hidden fees, or other forms of 
deceptive pricing.137 
The most straightforward truth-in-pricing rules require “all-in” pricing, that is, the 
advertising or display of any fees that are mandatory, or effectively so, and therefore part of the 
price.  Other price transparency rules require the disclosure of important optional fees, like baggage 
fees for airlines.138 
The National Economic Council has described a variety of reasons, related to competition, 
that pricing schemes may be of concern.  They include: 
“Deceptive pricing may also inhibit the competitive process. Specifically, it may hurt 
the ability of a price-cutting competitor to take business away from a more expensive 
rival. The creation of consumer confusion and wariness around actual prices may 
make consumers disbelieve advertised prices, making it harder for the genuine price-
cutter to attract consumers. Moreover, the higher-priced rival may use hidden fees to 
effectively shroud its comparatively higher prices. This may reduce real price 
competition.  
Fourth, unusual pricing practices may facilitate “follow-the-leader” pricing among 
competitors. The setting of “standard” add-on fees, which are in theory not part of 
the negotiated price, provides an ideal anchor for tacit coordination because they are 
typically set at the national level and fluctuate less frequently than the base prices 
themselves. As a result, for example, such fees make it easier for the airline industry 
to implement and sustain prices without an explicit agreement. In this example, the 
major airlines would likely find it easier to implement and sustain a ‘standard’ change 
fee of $250 as it may be easier to coordinate on that price than the prices for travel 
itself.139  
The Department of Transportation, for example, has imposed such rules on the airline 
industry, requiring that they list charges like gasoline surcharges and taxes in the price presented to 
																																																								
137  Charlie Anderson, Follow the Fees, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 28, 2016, 2:31 PM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/12/28/follow-fees. 
138 Guidance on Disclosure of Policies and Charges Associate with Checked Baggage, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,854 (May 
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consumers on their web site and on search engines.140  A Department of Transportation proposed 
rulemaking would also require that baggage fees and change fees be disclosed.141  
 
 
Part III: Potential and Perils  
 
 There is much potential, but also possible perils in any usage of rules to pursue the goals of 
antitrust.  The potential, not necessary to repeat at length, lies in opening markets long-closed to 
effective competition, and the consequent gains for consumers and the economy.  It also lies in the 
promotion of competition using a tool other than litigation-driven, ex post antitrust investigations, 
which have inherent limitations. 
 
 Yet, if the track-record of the last several decades suggests anything, it is that not all such 
schemes succeed.  This paper has attempted to develop some rules-of-thumb that might help future 
law-makers or regulators design pro-competitive rules that succeed.   They are, to summarize: 
 
(1) Government elimination of public, regulatory barriers is a more direct remedy than 
efforts to eliminate private barriers; regimes that require affirmative action by an 
incumbent are more challenging; 
(2) If the goal is opening a market through a separation rule, a clean cut that yields a real 
market is desirable; 
(3) If possible, the incumbent must be reduced to a passive role, at best, in the relationship 
between consumer and competitor; 
(4) Standards should be simple, and ideally passive in the manner just described;  
(5) Removing regulatory barriers to entry does not necessitate removing public protections; 
indeed, protections may need to be stronger. 
 
In closing, there are several further dangers that ought to also be considered: 
 
 First, a poorly designed regime may both fail to create any additional competition and worse, 
serve to insulate the industry from antitrust scrutiny.  Cases like Trinko or Credit-Suisse, which 
demand deference to comprehensive regulatory schemes, create the danger of nullifying antitrust 
oversight.142  Even if technically, the industry remains subject to the antitrust laws (through, for 
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example, a savings clause), the mere existence of the regime may make competition agencies hesitant 
to act. When it comes to cable set-top boxes, for example, the badly designed CableCARD regime 
has done little to spark competition or save consumers money.  However, it does seem to have been 
effective at keeping antitrust enforcers at bay. 
 
 Second, a poorly designed regime, or a market that, in fact, does not support a large number 
of competitors, may simply add a regulatory burden, without much benefit for consumers, 
competitors, or anyone at all. 
 
 Third, the cause of using laws to ensure “competition” can be used as an excuse to erode 
consumer protection or other public measures that really have nothing to do with the conditions of 
competition.  Given a public issue—say, the dangers of a product or service—it does not necessarily 
follow that a competitive market will be any more inclined to address the issue on its own.  Indeed, 
the industry may be less inclined due to the pressures of competition.  In this sense, it may 
sometimes be important to increase consumer protections when increasing competition – the story 
of the airline industry makes this point particularly clear. 
 
 Finally, it is a simple truth that any regulatory system, even an avowedly pro-competitive law, 
can be used to forestall, entrench, and otherwise damage competition.   This is a challenge to which 
there is no simple solution, other than ongoing vigilance. 
 
These warnings and rules of thumb are not intended to dissuade lawmakers or regulators 
from using rules to promote competition. As the greatest successes show, there lies enormous 
potential in using the power of rulemaking to promote the goals of the antitrust statutes, and the 




 Decades of experience have suggested that both adjudications and rules have their merits 
and disadvantages.   The specific history of the antitrust laws, and their relative age, has given 
adjudication (or litigation) a central role in creating antitrust policy.   Nonetheless, as the more 
successful examples here illustrated suggested, it is well worth asking whether the goals of antitrust 
policy might be well achieved using industry-specific rules, whether promulgated by the antitrust 
agencies themselves, or other agencies.		
